Thanks
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my colleagues Jessica Garland, Jessica Blair, Ian Simpson, Nia Thomas and Lizzie Lawless, as well as Professor Jennifer Piscopo for their help with the report.
Foreword
By Helen Pankhurst, Convenor of Centenary Action
Around the world women are still living for the most part under the laws that men have made. The lesson of this report is that while progress has been made it is happening too slowly. In this country, more than a century after some women first won the vote, just over a third of MPs are women and across the world the proportion of female parliamentarians is just over a quarter (26.5%). The UK is 48th in the world rankings of women in Parliament.
This report comes at an important time, as the debate around achieving equal representation for women is starting to focus on what meaningful steps can now be taken to accelerate progress. For instance, the Welsh Senedd is due to bring forward the Senedd Cymru (Electoral Candidates Lists) Bill. The Senedd was the first parliament in the UK to achieve a gender balance in its 2003 elections, but in the years since it has slipped back to male over-representation. Its gender quotas reforms look to ensure that equal representation is not a just fleeting achievement but an enduring status quo.
This study illustrates that where used, gender quotas are one of the most effective tools for increasing and sustaining gender representation in parliaments around the globe.
Yet it is not just the sluggish and sporadic progress towards equal representation that makes the case for more substantial action: We are also living in an era of rapid technological change that has seen an unprecedented rise in online misogyny. This in turn has made politics a far more hostile environment for women, as not only do they now have to surmount the institutional barriers placed in front of them but then endure torrents of abuse and threats on social media. This imperils what progress towards gender equality has been made as women are deterred from entering it in the first place or forced away from the political arena.
The best way to ensure the progress of equality across all areas of life is for the laws of the land to be informed by the lived experience of women. And that will only come from having proper representation of women in our legislative chambers.
This report outlines the various ways that that crucial progress can be advanced and achieved through gender quotas for elections and parties. There are many different ways this can be done and all have different levels of impact across various electoral systems, especially when combined with sanctions for under-representing women. But they all improve progress to achieving 50-50 gender representation.
If the 20th Century was the century where women won the right to vote, this century must be the century we realise the full promise of that struggle and see women – in all their diversity – gain equal representation in parliament.
In short, equal representation of women needs to become a basic requirement – the litmus test – of democracy rather than an optional aspiration.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Today, women make up only 35% of elected MPs in the House of Commons and whilst progress has been made, this has been largely down to positive action from parties. Yet electoral structures can also be designed to ensure fairer representation. This paper lays out the benefits and disadvantages of various quotas and discusses their implementation under two different families of voting systems, majoritarian/plurality and proportional. It finds that countries which have proportional representation voting systems and legislative quotas are more likely to have a larger percentage of women in parliament than those without.
Key findings:
- On average, countries with proportional or mixed voting systems have a higher number of women parliamentarians (29%) than countries that use a plurality or majoritarian voting system (22%).
- Gender quotas are a useful and effective mechanism for increasing gender parity in elected bodies. In 2022, chambers with quotas increased the growth rate of women’s representation by almost 3% from the previous year.
- Legislative quotas with sanctions for non-compliance are the most effective quota mechanism as they are compulsory, create accountability and are durable against party forces.
- A PR voting system is more conductive to implement legislative quotas than a majoritarian / plurality system due to; the likelihood of it having multi-member districts which allow for more candidates / diverse candidates to be fielded, increasing political space for smaller parties to push for adoption of quotas, and the ability to create flexible and adaptable quota mechanisms to fit a specific country context.
In 2022, on average 29% of those elected to lower of single house in countries which had proportional or mixed voting systems were women. In comparison, countries with a plurality or majority system, the average percentage of women elected to the lower or single house is 22.4%. This evidence shows that proportional voting systems are more conductive to increasing gender parity. Moreover, there is also a gap in the progress made towards gender parity depending on if the country has implemented gender quotas. The average growth rate of women’s representation in chambers with quotas in 2022 was +2.9 vs +1.7 in chambers without quotas. Therefore, quotas are also conductive to increasing gender parity.
However, not all quotas have the same level of effect on increasing gender parity. This paper finds that legislative quotas are the most effective at increasing women’s representation across the political party spectrum, especially when they come with sanctions for non-compliance. This is due to the compulsory nature of the quotas; meaning all political parties must engage with the quotas, the ability to enforce accountability via sanctions; meaning parties can be penalised for not reaching certain thresholds or non-compliance and the durability of the quota; the quotas are not dependent on political parties opting in and therefore they are able to continuously build women’s representation, with less chance of backsliding in comparison to voluntary quotas.
Proportional representation (PR) voting systems with multi-member districts are well suited to the application of a variety of legislative quotas, for the following reasons:
- The large number of parties in a PR system increase the probability that one party will actively promote women candidates and employ gender quotas.
- Numerous candidates are often fielded in a PR system and therefore there is more opportunity for more diverse candidates to be fielded, this allows a more balanced candidate list to be created.
- Majoritarian/plurality systems rely on 4 types of quotas which are relatively rigid in design; unlike quotas which are created within PR systems. Horizontal and vertical zipping are more intuitive to PR systems and are easier to specialise and adapt to specific country contexts.
Positive change can be achieved through individual party action but relying on singular measures leaves progress vulnerable to backsliding. Comparative evidence shows that gender parity is best achieved, and sustained, by legislative gender quotas within proportional electoral systems.
Introduction
Introduction
Throughout history, the political landscape of the United Kingdom has been predominantly shaped and governed by men. The struggle towards gender parity across the United Kingdom has been fought tirelessly throughout the 20th century. Women were given the right to stand as MPs in 1918, some women won the right to vote in 1918, the suffrage movement won the vote on the same terms as men in 1928, and the first woman prime minister was appointed in 1979. Due to coordinated efforts of campaigners and activists, over the last 100 years an increasing number of women have assumed roles in politics. This shift is particularly evident in the increase in women Members of Parliament (MPs) who, as of February 2024 totalled 226 out of the 650 MPs, (35%). However, whilst the number of women MPs has increased, there is still a long way to go in order to achieve gender parity in elected bodies in the UK.
Across the world, as of 1st Jan 2023, there are only 6 Parliaments (Mexico, Nicaragua, Cuba, Rwanda, Andorra and the United Arab Emirates) which have gender parity in their lower or single house.
Other countries have achieved gender parity previously, such as Wales in 2003, however these have fallen back into male majorities in recent years. Globally there is an increasing number of women parliamentarians; in 1995 women made up only 11.3%, whereas by the end of 2022 women made up 26.5% of parliamentarians. However, whilst it is positive that there is an increasing number of women members, 2022 showed the slowest progression of women’s representation in parliaments in 6 years, only increasing 0.4% from the previous year. If this rate continues, it will take over 80 years for gender parity to be realised globally. It is evident that there is more work to be done before parliamentary gender parity becomes a reality.
Quotas are a key mechanism to enable gender parity. In 2022 there were 18 countries which had a change in parliament where legislated gender quotas were in place in the single or lower house. In these countries 30.3% of the total number of MPs are women. In comparison, in countries with no gender quotas (19) which had a parliamentary renewal e.g. change in parliament, only 22.2% of parliamentarians elected were women. There is an 8-point percentage difference in gender parity achievement between countries with quotas and those without.
There are multiple types of gender quotas, and the ease and effectiveness of implementation can differ across voting systems. This paper will explore the different quota mechanisms through which gender parity can be achieved, examining the benefits and the potential drawbacks of the approaches. It will then assess the ease and success of quota implementation across majoritarian and proportional voting systems. Following this, country case studies of several of the approaches will explore the mechanisms in action.
This report will illustrate how implementing gender quotas and moving to a proportional representation voting system (PR) can help speed up the progress of achieving gender parity in elected bodies around the world and at home.
Quota Mechanisms
Reserved Seats
The first of the types of quotas this paper will discuss are reserved seats. Reserved seats are seats which are set aside for women which men are unable to contest. Forty-one countries use reserved seats. Typically the proportion of seats set aside is quite low, for example, in Bangladesh 50 of the 350 seats in the Lower House are reserved for women and in Lesotho 30% of the seats are reserved for women which are distributed to parties in proportion to their elections results at a sub-national level. Reserved seats can come in a variety of different formats:
1. A women-only nation-wide tier
This method can either be via districts which are specifically designed to elect women parliamentarians; via a separate tier of women MPs directly elected in single-member districts (SMDs); or via a separate tier where all-women national lists are used.
2. Constituencies reserved for women
This method ensures that certain constituencies will only elect women candidates. In some countries, such as India, these constituencies are rotated in each electoral cycle. This differs from women-only nation-wide tiers as it is pre-existing constituencies which are reserved for women rather than specifically created tiers of reserved seats for women.
3. The ‘best loser system’
This method reserves seats for women who did not win seats but who gained the most votes of the women candidates. The seats are then allocated to the candidates who gained the most votes, this can mean that certain constituencies are overrepresented in parliament.
Reserved seats are not solely used for women, in many cases they have been employed to guarantee a political voice to marginalised communities, what constitutes a marginalised community depends on the political context of a specific country. For example, Latin American and Oceanic countries often have reserved seats for indigenous people whereas other countries reserve seats for minority religions, languages, nationalities and class. Reserving seats guarantees political representation of women in parliament; however it does not acknowledge the intersectionality of women and therefore cannot claim to guarantee representation of all women.
Non-legislative party quotas
Party quotas rely on each political party to mandate gender quotas in their candidate lists. These are ‘voluntary pledges by parties to include a specific percentage of women’, therefore they are optional and not enforceable by law. These types of quotas have ranged from 25% to 50% of women on candidate lists. As these quotas are not legislated, it is at a party’s discretion whether it implements gender quotas. This means that the roll out of gender quotas is not necessarily uniform across the political system, nor mandated in the exact same way in each party. Not having standardised mechanisms for implementing gender quotas across parties could lead to inequitable access to quotas across the political system. Moreover, if a woman is standing as an independent candidate, they do not benefit from this type of quota. By placing the responsibility for implementing gender quotas on individual political parties, the state delegates the responsibility for tackling the gender inequality of political candidate nominations.
Another potential drawback of the party quota system is that parties can meet their mandated quotas for women but not stand women in seats where that party has a chance of winning e.g., in safe or competitive seats. Hence a perfunctory application of gender quotas could see a party fail to impact the gender parity of parliament even with voluntary quotas in place.
Gender quotas influence on parties
There is evidence of voluntary introduction of party quotas influence on other parties to adopt quotas. Table 1 shows how the main political parties in Germany all implemented quotas in the space of 13 years from 1983 following the adoption of a 50% gender quota by the Green Party. Krook and O’Brien (2010) note that ‘early adopters tend to be small, new-left wing parties’, they are then followed by more centrist parties who are ‘concerned about possible erosion of electoral support’ via new left-wing parties skimming off supporters of quotas. This process of parties adopting voluntary gender quotas one-by-one has been termed a contagion effect by academics such as Matland and Studlar (1996).
Table 1: German Political Party quotas* (in order of date of quota adoption)
| Party |
Year of quota adoption |
Quota details |
| Alliance 90/The Greens |
1983 |
50 percent quota for women on party lists. |
| Social Democratic Party of Germany |
1990 |
At least 40 % of each gender on boards and lists. |
| The Left Party |
1990 |
The first two and then every other place is reserved for women on nomination lists. |
| Christian Democratic Union |
1993 |
At least a third of all electoral lists and party officials should be women, if the quota is not met the internal election will be re-run. |
| Christian Social Union in Bavaria |
1996 |
Women and men should each hold 50% of the offices. Party and district boards are only valid if half of those elected are women. For public elections the party must ensure balanced participation of men and women. |
*Only political parties represented in parliament which have a gender quota in place are included.
Adapted from: Matland and Studlar (1996) and Gender Quotas Database (2022)
Germany is an example of one of 68 countries where at least one political party has adopted gender quotas. In Germany’s case, there is evidence of a contagion effect whereby ‘the dynamics of party competition explain the adoption of party gender quotas’. However, the contagion effect has been critiqued by others such as Kenny and MacKay (2013) who emphasise the need to look at ‘trends across all levels in a multi-level political system rather than consider national performance in isolation’ and they note that we cannot assume that quotas will diffuse across the political system if adopted by one party. Moreover, parties do not only react to electoral competition pressures, ‘they are also responding to wider political pressures, as well as intra-party pressures, tensions and power struggle’; hence we cannot rely on voluntary party quotas and the contagion effect to entrench gender quotas into our electoral system.
Legislative quotas
Legislative quotas are laws which require a certain percentage of women to be nominated by each political party. They can be mandated via candidate selection and at party list level. As they are set in law there can be repercussions for parties who do not meet the gender quota. For example, in Belgium, Article 117.1 of the Electoral Code mandates that there must be equal numbers of male and female candidates on each candidate list and that they must alternate. If parties do not comply with this the ‘electoral committee of the constituency rejects the list’. Furthermore, a legislated quota means all political parties must adhere to the same rules and stipulations which removes the ad-hoc implementation of party quotas.
The IPU acknowledges that legislative quotas are only impactful if they are ‘clear, well drafted and supported by enforcement mechanisms’. An example of the necessity of well-drafted and implemented gender quotas comes from Algeria. In 2011, following the Arab Spring, Algeria mandated that a third of seats in parliament and local government be set aside for women. In 2017 this mechanism enabled Algeria to rank 26th on a global level for women’s political representation at national and local levels and first amongst Arab countries. This law also stipulated with Article 202 that all candidate lists must have gender parity, or the list would not be accepted. However, shortly after the first election under this law in 2012, there was backlash due to the perceived inadequacies of women parliamentarians and religious and societal norms. In 2021, Article 317 superseded Article 202, a watered-down version of the previous law which stated that instead of non-compliant lists being disallowed, the party / independents would only have to inform the election authority of the non-compliance but would still be allowed to stand for election and win seats. Following this change in law, women’s representation fell to 8% (34 of 407 seats) in the 2021 election, a drastic fall from 31% of seats held in 2012 (145 of 462 seats) and 26% seats held in 2017 (120 of 462 seats) when the law disallowing lists without gender parity was in place.
The above example shows how effective quotas can be, but that they must also be individually designed for each specific country’s context and have buy in from the public, the legislature and civil society in order for them to work in that country.
The European Institute for Gender Equality (2021) (EIGE) found that legislative action to increase gender balance in parliament through quotas ‘generally stimulates progress’. Their analysis of EU member states since 2004 comparing those which have legislative quotas, verses those which do not, shows that in countries with legislated candidate quotas doubled the percentage of women members of parliament between 2004 and 2021 from 17.3% to 34.9% (an increase of 17.6 percentage points). In contrast, countries without quotas had a 6 percentage point higher base level for women parliamentarians in 2004 (23.2%), but by 2021 it had only risen 8.4 percentage points to 31.6%. The EIGE determined that if this current trend persists then ‘countries with legislated quotas will achieve gender balance in 5 years (2026), while the ‘no action’ group will take closer to two decades (2038).’ The EIGE considers gender balance to be achieved when there is at least 40% of each gender represented in a country’s parliament.
Figure 1: Share of women in single/lower houses of national parliaments, by type of action (%, EU-27, 2004–2039)
Note: The dotted line indicates the time projected to reach gender balance.*
*The EIGE views gender balance to be achieved when there is at least 40% of each gender represented in a country’s parliament.
Quota implementation in different electoral systems
Application of quotas under electoral systems
For a political system to be fully democratic it must enable the political equality of all as a minimum condition, therefore political systems which allow for easy application of quotas have greater democratic opportunities as they enable the participation of a wider range of people in politics. Quotas can be implemented across various electoral systems, including majoritarian such as First Past the Post systems (FPTP) and a range of PR systems. This section will discuss the ease and success of quota implementation across this range of electoral systems, finishing with case studies as evidence.
Majoritarian systems, including the FPTP system we use at Westminster, typically use single member districts (SMDs). In a SMD, the voter elects one person to represent them per district. These types of system prioritise single party control of the representative body, e.g., Westminster, over the closeness of the result to voter preferences (the proportionality of the result).
In contrast, Proportional Representation systems tend to use multi-member districts (MMDs) (wholly or partly) to elect their representatives which means there are multiple representatives per constituency or for the area. This allows for a more proportional allocation of seats in line with voter preferences.
Majoritarian systems
Whilst PR systems provide more opportunities for improving representation, there are instances of gender quotas being implemented around the world under majoritarian systems.
There are various versions of quotas which can be implemented in a majority/plurality voting system: nomination quotas in SMDs, super districts, rotating districts and alternate thresholds; these are discussed below.
Nomination quotas in SMDs
The objective of nomination quotas is to make sure that women candidates are on the ballot. Quotas can be legally mandated, incentivised (e.g. fines in places if quotas are not met) or voluntary. There are normally minimum threshold and sanctions for non-compliance. This ensures that parties are incentivised to include women on ballots, however it does not ensure women-candidates are elected (this is the only version of quotas which does not ensure women are elected).
France has used nomination quotas since 2000, these vary in application across their different parliamentary bodies due to the different voting systems, however all are aiming for 50% women in each parliamentary body. The National Assembly elects its members by single-member constituencies, via a two-round majoritarian system. Electoral law states that the difference of the number of candidates of each sex cannot be greater than 2% in a party or group of parties. Non-compliance with this law results in a financial penalty.
Figure 2 highlights the percentage change of women nominated and elected to the National Assembly since the introduction of the law. Nomination of women candidates quickly rose after the implementation of the law in 2000. In 1997, only 25% women candidates were nominated, by 2002, nominations of women came close to 40% of the total nominations. Since then, the percentage of women nominated has fluctuated minimally, however the percentage of women candidates elected has continuously risen.
Christensen and Bardall (2014) note that with each election since the introduction of the quota the success rate of women candidates is improving. Figure 2 shows that the success of women candidates has increased by over 30 percentage points since the introduction of the nomination quota (% of women nominated / % women elected). To explain this, they suggest that previously ‘French parties may have systematically nominated women in less winnable constituencies than male candidates, but over time more and more women are being elected. This implies that parties have become better at recruiting and nominating women candidates, and/or that women aspirants have become better at securing nomination in winnable constituencies’. However, this trend is not guaranteed to sustain itself as this system of quotas relies on parties nominating women candidates, meaning the ongoing success of this quota option is dependent on a party’s engagement and support of quotas.
Figure 2: Gender Balance in French National Assembly
Super districts (a version of reserved seats – a women-only nation-wide tier)
Super districts are an additional tier of women representatives. This tier is directly elected via a separate ballot to the candidates in other tiers. The women elected in the super district join the same elected body as those not in the super district. This method is used in Uganda and ensures women are represented in parliament.
Rotating districts (a version of reserved seats – constituencies reserved for women)
A proportion of constituencies are reserved as women-only candidate constituencies, these are then rotated every election cycle; therefore, with each cycle of the election the quotas is implemented in different constituencies spreading the impact geographically. This system has been implemented in local government in India, in eight years the percentage of women in local government increased from 5% in 1992 to 40% in 2000.
The main drawback of this approach is that it effectively implements a term-length on elected candidates, either male or female and this can be restrictive in terms of legislative impact across multiple election cycles.
Alternate thresholds (a version of reserved seats – the ‘best loser system’)
This method reserves seats for women who did not win seats but who gained the most votes across all women candidates. The pre-determined number of seats are then allocated to the candidates who gained the most votes, this can mean that certain constituencies are overrepresented in parliament.
Overall, candidate nomination quotas such as the ones seen in France are the simplest to create under a plurality/majoritarian system as it would not necessitate a huge structural change to the voting system that the other quota options discussed would entail. However; it would rely on party cooperation and buy-in if these quotas were not incentivised through sanctions for non-compliance. Even if these quotas were legislative and came with sanctions, Hoodfar and Tajali (2011) note that ‘legislative quotas that apply to candidate lists might not be the best fit for a majoritarian/plurality electoral system with low district magnitude [such as the UK], since individuals rather than the parties compete for votes and parties are less likely to risk nominating a female candidate to run against a male candidate’.
Moreover, in the UK, there has been ‘little appetite for quotas’ both from the main parties and from the public however, there has been success using all-women shortlists by the Labour Party. Their use of all-women shortlists (introduced in 2010), a form of voluntary party quotas, have made the greatest impact on gender parity in parliament. In the 2019 general election, Labour contributed 46% of the women MPs in parliament, 53% of their own MPs were women. Leaving gender parity to individual parties leaves progress at risk of internal party politics and unequal implementation across the political system. This could mean only a certain subset of women are elected (from one party for instance) and therefore a narrower version of representation is achieved.
Majoritarian/plurality systems with no quotas are least likely to elect women, women only made up 19.5% of those elected in in 2022 under these conditions. If elected there is no guarantee that women’s representation will continue to increase, unless quotas are legislated and enforced with a punitive measure. Majoritarian systems which do not have legislative quotas are prone to backsliding which is not mitigated by the implementation of voluntary quotas; reasons why voluntary party quotas cannot mitigate backsliding include:
- Voluntary quotas can be removed without consultation, and;
- Voluntary quotas can be applied unequally across parties, and;
- all parties opt-in to voluntary quotas, meaning that if in the next election cycle a party without gender quotas wins more seats, it can drastically reduce the number of women in the chamber.
Proportional Representation
Proportional electoral systems by contrast, use multi-member districts (MMDs).
A proportional electoral system ‘is considered to be the most favourable to women’s representation in parliaments […] because the associated electoral elements (namely, district and party magnitudes, the formula used in allocation of seats, and the ballot structure) are more responsive to increasing women’s access to political participation.’
Horizontal and Vertical zipping
It is easier to implement quotas in electoral systems which use proportional representation, one relatively simple option would be to apply zipping to party lists. Zipping refers to a range of systems where genders are alternated within lists or across constituencies. There is no standardised mechanism for implementing zipping and countries use varying systems to zip their quotas (examples are discussed below) but the most effective quotas are those that use both vertical and horizontal distribution.
Vertical Distribution – This can only be implemented if a party-list system is used. The fundamental principle of this distribution is to have equal or close to equal candidates of different genders on the party-list. A typical list would contain 50% women and 50% men. Vertical zipping dictates that going down a party list, no two adjacent candidates may be of the same gender.
Horizontal Distribution – Across all constituencies the number of different genders standing should be equal or close to equal. Horizontal zipping can specify to each party the gender of the candidate at the top of the list which must alternate between constituencies, or alternatively parties may decide this themselves as long as they present a balanced top-of-list across all constituencies.
Table 2: Example of vertical distribution by party lists in a constituency
|
Red Party |
Orange Party |
Yellow Party |
|
Red (F) |
Orange (M) |
Yellow (F) |
|
Red (M) |
Orange (F) |
Yellow (M) |
|
Red (F) |
Orange (F) |
Yellow (M) |
|
Red (M) |
Orange (M) |
Yellow (F) |
| % women standing for each party |
50% |
50% |
50% |
There are a range of examples of how PR systems using closed lists deliver vertical ranking:
- zebra or zipper systems: alternating female and male candidates throughout the lists (as used in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Libya, Nicaragua, Senegal, Tunisia and Zimbabwe); alternation is used by many Green parties as well Social Democratic parties;
- a requirement that the top two candidates are not of the same sex (used in Belgium);
- 40:60 ratio for every five posts on the list (Spain); and
- one out of every group of three candidates must be a woman (Albania, Argentina, Indonesia, Serbia, Timor-Leste).
To be most effective vertical distribution should be accompanied by guarantees of fair horizontal distribution, e.g., a version of horizontal distribution which ensures that women are placed in winnable seats. If the system uses vertical mechanisms without considering horizontal mechanisms or vice versa it may not achieve the desired outcome of electing a significant proportion of women to parliament.
Table 3: Examples of horizontal distribution across constituencies
Example A: 50:50 quota for women and men standing across 5 constituencies
|
Constituency A |
Constituency B |
Constituency C |
Constituency D |
Constituency E |
Total no. women and men standing across constituency A-E |
| No. women standing |
3 |
30% |
5 |
50% |
6 |
60% |
4 |
40% |
7 |
70% |
25 |
| No. men standing |
7 |
70% |
5 |
50% |
4 |
40% |
6 |
60% |
3 |
30% |
25 |
Example B: Alternating genders at the top of a party candidate lists to ensure 50:50 representation at the top of party lists across 6 constituencies
| Constituency |
Example 1 |
Example 2 |
Example 3 |
| Area 1 |
F |
M |
F |
| Area 2 |
M |
M |
F |
| Area 3 |
F |
M |
F |
| Area 4 |
M |
F |
M |
| Area 5 |
F |
F |
M |
| Area 6 |
M |
F |
M |
| Genders at the top of the list across constituencies |
50% women
50% men |
50% women
50% men |
50% women
50% men |
F – Female, M – Male
Horizontal distribution can be used to ensure:
- the number of women and men standing across several constituencies is equal (or close to equal),
- that women are placed in safe seats,
- that all parties using lists are alternating the genders of their first candidates in each constituency
- horizontal distribution can also specify that for each party the candidate gender at the top of the list must alternate between constituencies
Examples of zipping around the world
Examples of countries which use horizontal and / or vertical distribution in different forms include:
Costa Rica
Costa Rica uses closed-list PR with vertical and horizontal zipping across its seven provincial level districts. The Women’s Committee proposed the inclusion of horizontal as well as vertical zipping in the 2010-2014 sitting of the Costa Rican Assembly. The proposal was that parties must zip their lists and alternate the gender of the top candidate in each of the seven districts. It would require ‘each party to nominate women to the first list position in at least three of the seven provinces, thus guaranteeing gender balance in electoral results’. This proposal was supported in the media and no legislators spoke against it. In 2016 the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) adopted a resolution which mandated that the first position of at least three of the seven lists presented by a party must abide by the principle of parity this led to an “increase in the percentage of lists headed by women: from 22% in 2014 to 43.39% in this present election [2018]”.
In recent consultations on electoral reform the idea was proposed that districts that use closed-list PR could be tiered into safe/competitive/losing for each party depending on the outcome of the previous election. The parties would then have to respect horizontal parity within those tiers; hence women and men would be placed in both previously won seats (safe seats), competitive seats and previously unsuccessful seats; eliminating the potential for women to be placed in non-winnable seats if non-tiered horizontal parity was enacted.
Mexico
A similar process is used in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies for single-member constituencies. There is an administrative rule for the 300 single-member constituencies, the constituencies are divided into different tiers: safe, competitive and losing tiers. The tiering is done by party and each party must ensure gender parity within each tier; this ensures vertical gender parity within tiers and works to increase women being placed in winnable seats as gender parity must apply across all constituencies. For the remaining seats in the Chamber of Deputies (200), horizontal parity is applied for the closed regional lists of each of the 5 regional level lists a party presents they must list women candidates in 2 of the top 5 places.
Chile
The first constitutional convention took place in Chile between July 2021 and July 2022. For this convention a special gender parity election law was enacted which required equal numbers of men and women delegates to be proposed and ‘that all lists have women in the first-position’. These were open lists, the rationale behind this law was to normalise women having the first position on the list as ‘even in open lists, there’s an advantage to being named to the top spot’.
Other suggestions for zipping
Suggestions for other versions of zipping come from academics such as Piscopo (2023), who have outlined other proposals for zipping.
Geography
In a similar vein as the safe/competitive/losing tiers, another option could be to divide the districts by geography, e.g., North, South, Central etc. Horizontal parity would be required in each geographic group. For example, if the Central group had 4 districts within it, then it would require women to be at the top of the list in two districts.
Lottery
For every election a number of districts would be selected at random, in order to ensure the greatest gender parity this would have to be 50% of the districts. Any lists of candidates drawn in these districts must place a woman at the top of their lists. Therefore, every district would have an equal opportunity to have either a man or woman as their first-position candidate in every election round.
Comparison of effectiveness of gender quotas under PR and majoritarian systems
In relation to quotas, Dahlerup and Freidenvall state that ‘it is much more complicated to construct gender quotas that are appropriate for single-member constituency electoral systems’. This has been evidenced in their previous
work examining the French National Assembly. The French National Assembly primarily uses single member districts (SMD) with a two-round voting system, and as of 2013, municipal elections in towns with more than 1,000 inhabitants use PR (a two-round party list system). In 2000, France adopted a 50-50 gender quota which required all elections conducted under PR to have equal numbers of men and women on the ballot, this includes the European Parliament, the majority of seats in the Senate, and municipal and regional elections. The law stipulated that parties ‘present 50 per cent of its candidates of each sex’ if this condition is not met then the list is invalidated. Reforms in 2003 and 2007 saw alternation of the sex of candidates introduced to increase gender parity. For SMDs, such as those used for the National Assembly, the 2000 law put into place financial penalties for parties that do not ‘present 50 per cent of its candidates of each sex’ (with 2% leeway).
After the instigation of the quota, the percentage of women in the National Assembly increased from 10.9% (1997) to 12.3% in the 2002 election and to 18.5% in 2007. Research by Murray (2004) has shown that women candidates were disproportionately placed in unwinnable seats in the 2002 election therefore the impact of the gender quotas was minimal. In contrast, Sineau (2008) finds that ‘in French municipal elections […] the quotas provision in combination with stronger sanctions for non-compliance resulted in an historic leap in women’s representation from 25.7 % to 47.5% and later to 48.5%’. Hence, a PR system, with gender quotas and strong disciplinary measures (such as invalidated lists rather than fines) for non-compliance has proven more successful in increasing gender parity than a SMD majoritarian system with minimal measures for non-compliance.
Table 4: Showing the between the French National Assembly and Municipal Council election outcomes pre- and post-quota
|
|
|
|
Election result |
| Election |
Electoral System |
Legislated Gender Quotas |
Compliance measures |
Pre-quota |
Post-quota |
| National Assembly |
Majoritarian, Single-member District, two-round system |
50% of candidates of each sex (2% leeway) |
Financial penalties for non-compliance |
10.9% (1997) |
12.3% (2002)
18.5% (2007) |
| Municipal council* |
Proportional Representation, Multi-member Districts two-round party list |
50% of candidates of each sex |
Non-compliance will invalidate the list |
25.7% (1995) |
47.5% (2001) 48.5% (2008) |
(Implementation considering the electoral system and compliance measures in place)
*Pre-2013 only towns with over 3,500 inhabitants used PR, post-2013 towns with over 1,000 inhabitants used PR.
Matland and Studlar (1996) highlight three ways in which PR systems with MMDs are better at promoting gender equality than majoritarian (generally single member district) systems.
- Majoritarian electoral systems go hand in hand with two-party systems, often artificially sustaining them against voter choices. Matland and Studlar propose that two-party systems also hold back gender equality because they lack the stimulus of minor parties which may create innovative ideas for increasing women’s representation. Without the stimulus of a third party, the major two parties may not have the pressure to change existing party or electoral systems to promote women candidates, and activists and campaigners can only ‘argue for better representation […] on equity grounds’ lacking the pressure from other parties. They argue that ‘the greater number of parties in proportional representation systems provides an increased probability that one party will decide actively to promote women candidates and set the contagion process in motion’.
- PR systems often use MMDs where parties field numerous candidates within the same district. There is therefore an opportunity to field more diverse candidates with consideration of the balance between them. By contrast, in single member districts the focus is on one candidate, often the incumbent, without the opportunity to consider the balance across candidates.
- In SMDs it may be necessary to remove an incumbent or go against central party interest in order to put forward a woman candidate. Matland and Studlar argue that under these conditions it may be ‘better to ignore the external challenge […] than to risk creating internal strife and antagonizing powerful intraparty interest’.
As Christensen and Bardall (2014) also highlight, in single member districts (SMDs), parties usually stand the candidate who is perceived as the ‘most broadly acceptable to their constituency, often resulting in slates of male-only candidates’. PR systems, especially those with MMDs, foster less pressured contests for seats and therefore can present a more balanced list of candidates. More women are usually included in contests which have larger district magnitudes.
Moreover, Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2011) note that within a PR system, specifically party-list PR systems, due to the use of lists, the number of available seats at district level is larger than within SMDs and therefore the number of spaces for women candidate nominations is increased. Therefore, PR systems with these larger district magnitudes are more favourable to the adoption of gender quotas, as they allow for the nomination of many candidates for winnable seats across and within districts rather than one candidate per party per district.
The effects of single-member and multi-member districts on the election of women can be seen in Germany. In their 1992 paper, Lancaster and Davis (1992) documented the difference in Germany’s mixed member system. At this time roughly half of the seats in the Bundestag were elected via the proportional list and half by single member constituencies. In the 1990 election, the list seats resulted in twice the number of women elected than in the constituencies.
A Mixed Member Proportional system (MMP), often called Additional Member System (AMS), like the one used in Germany is a mix of FPTP and PR.
Voters get 2 ballot papers; the first ballot paper is a vote for the local candidate they would like to represent them in Parliament. The second ballot paper is a list of parties who want seats in the parliament. The first ballot paper is counted first via FPTP, the candidate with the most votes in the constituency wins, even if most people didn’t vote for them.
The second ballot papers are then counted. The people counting look at how many seats a party won on the first ballot paper. They then add ‘additional members’ from the party lists to make parliament match how the country voted on the second ballot paper.
PR systems are the most conductive to quota implementation and success
The link between PR systems and greater representation of women is well established. It has been highlighted by academics and practitioners for the last three decades that the structure of the electoral system has influence on women’s representation, ‘The most significant factor affecting levels of women’s representation is generally considered to be the difference between party-list proportional systems and systems employing single-member districts’.
The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 2022 review found that, in countries with proportional representation or mixed electoral systems, on average 29% women were elected to lower or single houses. Conversely, in countries with a plurality or majority system, the average percentage of women elected to the lower or single house is 22.4%. Moreover, the review showed there is also a gap in the progress made depending on if they had quotas instigated ‘the average growth rate in women’s representation in chambers with quotas was +2.9 percentage points, versus +1.7 percentage points in chambers with no quotas’. Figure 2 highlights the differences between the share of women elected depending on the quota mechanism and the electoral system. It shows that countries which use Proportional Representation and have legislated quotas have the largest share of women in the lower/single house (31.4%).
The figure below shows that, of the countries that went to the polls in 2022, only countries which use proportional representation plus either voluntary or legislated quotas have achieved ‘critical mass’ on average across the group. It is widely accepted that when women’s representation reaches ‘critical mass’ i.e. 30%, it is ‘likely to have a policy impact that benefits other women and promotes gender equality’.
The theory of ‘critical mass’ is widely discussed in academia and is often cited as a reason to introduce gender quotas. The theory of ‘critical mass’ originates from nuclear physics and has been applied to gender and minority research to illustrate a turning point ‘following an increase in number or percentage of those under-represented or out-numbered’ in an organisation of power. When the number of women reaches a substantial figure they can act as ‘an effective interest group demanding greater representation and influence in decision making’. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolved that the target for increasing the proportion of women in leadership would rise from a lower target of 30% by 1995 to 50% in 2000. The target of 30% is seen as the minimum requirement for a ‘critical mass’ to be achieved and this figure is echoed throughout both academia and policy making.
Figure 3: Average percentage of women elected in 2022 in lower/single houses by electoral system and use of quotas
“Proportional Representation” includes countries with mixed systems.
Case studies of countries with majoritarian and proportional representation systems with and without gender quotas
New Zealand
In November 2022 New Zealand became a majority female parliament, joining Mexico, Nicaragua, Cuba, Rwanda and the United Arab Emirates. Due to the resignation of the former speaker, the gender balance of the New Zealand parliament has now tipped to 67 women and 56 men. The catalyst for this impressive achievement was the move to proportional representation in 1993. Since then, New Zealand’s parliament has ‘become more diverse and representative of modern New Zealand society’. Following the 2005 election, there were 39 women, 21 Māori, 4 Pacific and 2 Asian MPs among Parliament’s 121 members. In 2020 this figure rose across all minority groups to 58 women (48% of MPs), 25 Māori, 11 Pacific and 8 Asian MPs. The graph below (Figure 4) shows the diversity of the MPs since 1931, it clearly shows that with the adoption of PR in 1993 there has been an increase in women and Māori MPs. The graph also highlights that prior to the adoption of PR in 1993 there were no Pacific and non- pākehā MPs. In 2022, post-PR adoption, there are there are 11 MPs of each Pacific and non-pakeha heritage.
There are currently no legislative gender quotas in New Zealand, however the Green Party and the Labour Party have instigated party quotas.
Figure 4: Number of New Zealand MPs by ethnicity and gender (1931-2022)
Wales
At Westminster, Wales is represented by 40 MPs of which 14 are women (35%), 9 of whom are Labour MPs (64% of all Welsh women MPs). Westminster elections are by FPTP and there are no legislative gender quotas. There are instances of quotas by the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats in Wales, however these are not widespread or systematically implemented in Westminster elections. In terms of Welsh members of the Westminster Parliament, it is evident that party quotas are having an impact on the gender diversity of elected MPs however, this is reliant on parties continuing their commitment to voluntary quotas.
In contrast, the Welsh Senedd currently uses an Additional Member System, similar to MMP in Germany. AMS in Wales uses a mix of FPTP constituencies and party lists. Since the Senedd’s beginnings it has been much more effective at electing women MSs than Westminster. In 2003 it became the first legislature to reach gender parity in the World with 30 men and 30 women MSs. Whilst this has slid backwards to some extent (displayed in Figure 5), it has remained above 40% (the figure the EIGE uses as its benchmark for gender balance) and gender balance in the Senedd has consistently been better than Westminster since its conception (the Scottish Parliament, which also uses AMS, reached 45% women MSPs in 2021).
Gender quotas are not currently fixed in legislation in the Senedd, which (as Figure 5 shows below) leaves the gender balance of the Senedd susceptible to backsliding. Whilst the percentage of women in the Senedd has never fallen below the EIGE benchmark (40%) since the Senedd reached parity in 2003, it has been two decades since gender balance was achieved and this has not been realised again in the four subsequent elections.
Figure 5: Gender balance at each Senedd election since 1999
As of 2021 43% of MSs are women, only one of these MSs is a woman of colour. The gender balance varies drastically between parties, 57% of Labour MSs, 38% of Plaid Cymru MSs and 19% of Conservative MSs. The only Liberal Democrat MS is a woman. There is also disparity between the gender balance of candidates standing for election. In 2021, 470 candidates stood for election, of these 322 (69%) were men and 148 (31%) were women. Of the constituency candidates, 71% were men (220) and 29% (89) were women. Those elected as MSs totalled 57% men and 43% women. Following the same trend, on the regional lists, 223 (68%) candidates were men, and 104 (32%) were women, 45% of MSs elected via the regional list in the 2021 election were women and 55% were men. Due to the current make-up of the Senedd, and a larger pool of women MSs, there are increasing numbers of women in the running for Cabinet roles, hence there has been an increase in women holding Cabinet positions (the Cabinet is currently majority women). To mitigate any further backsliding, the Senedd has started to think about measures which will permanently increase gender parity.
Figure 6: Gender of candidates and elected MSs in the 2021 Senedd election
One of these measures is a plan to implement a party list system with integrated gender quotas, with the Senedd Cymru (Electoral Candidates Lists) Bill being introduced to the Senedd. The Expert Panel on Assembly Reform recommended that prescriptive gender quotas should be integrated into the electoral system, these quotas should ‘include targets with embedded penalties and incentives’. If not legislated for, the Panel noted that political parties should ‘be expected to take steps to ensure their candidate selection processes support and encourage the election of a gender-balanced parliament for Wales’ via voluntary party quotas. This decision has come in part from evidence of the success of gender quotas around the world and the support for gender quotas from the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action, the EU and the Council of Europe.
The Republic of Ireland
The Republic of Ireland uses the Single Transferable Vote voting system and has legislated party gender quotas, enforced via electoral law, since 2012. If these quotas (40% men and 40% women) are not met by the parties then parties lose 50% of their state funding. This threshold rose to 40% from 30% in 2023. The current Dáil Éireann cohort, elected in 2020, has 23% women Teachta Dála, in 1997 this figure was half that (12% women). In the first election since the legal gender quotas applied in 2016, there was the highest number and proportion of women candidates in any election in the Republic of Ireland. Analysis by Buckley showed that of the 551 candidates who contested the election, 163 (30 per cent) were women this represented a 90% increase in the number of women who stood as candidate in 2011, the previous general election.
Figure 7: Percentage of men and women TDs between 1997 and 2020
Issues for Discussion
Issues for discussion
This report has examined the use and implementation of gender quotas, understanding gender as a binary concept. Further attention and work are necessary to both acknowledge and understand the impact of existing intersections, such as ethnicity and age on the effectiveness of gender quotas and how gender quotas can be further evolved to include non-binary identities. This work is already being undertaken by some such as Hughes who examined the effects of quotas on women and other minority groups. The findings from this work show that tandem quotas, where ‘national gender policies are adopted alongside minority quotas’ are the only form of quotas from those included in the research (party, national, minority, mixed and tandem quotas) that would benefit minority women the most. The table below shows Hughes’ (2011) findings on the beneficiaries of different quota policies. It is imperative that when devising quotas that the intersectionality of potential candidates is acknowledged, otherwise policies to increase gender parity may succeed in only increasing gender parity for some whilst reducing opportunities for other minorities.
Table 5: Summary of Effects of Quota Policies for Minority and Majority Women and Men
| Quota Type |
Primary Beneficiaries |
Not Beneficial For |
| Party gender quotas |
Majority women |
Minority men |
| National gender quotas |
Woman (majority more) |
Minority men |
| Minority quotas |
Minorities (men more) |
Majority women |
| Mixed quotas |
Minority men and majority women |
Minority women |
| Tandem quotas |
Minority women |
Majority men and women |
Table modified from Hughes (2011)
In New York candidates and campaigners are challenging the binary gender quotas used by the Brooklyn Democratic Party and the New York City Board of Elections. In 2020, six trans and non-binary candidates were informed they were ‘disqualified by the New York City Board of Elections for failing to demarcate a binary gender on their papers, violating both the state Democratic Party bylaws and the New York State election codes bound by ‘one man, one woman’ laws’. This rule was created in 1920 with the view of increasing women’s representation and involvement in the local politics. The first instance of the realisation of this rule was the creation of the role of District Leaders which must be held by one man and one woman. The positions were not legislative, District Leaders were elected to run the party in any given district.
However, whilst these rules were created as progressive policies to increase women’s representation, they now have come to restrict the ability of trans, non-binary and intersex candidates to run for office. In 2018, the Democratic National Committee got rid of their gender binary rules, which mandated that all committees and like bodies be divided equally between men and women. Replacing this with language which includes the provision for gender self-identification for trans people and for non-binary members who will not be counted as either male or female in these circumstances. Similarly, in 2022, New York addressed this limitation by including a non-binary category in the options on the gender designations in elected positions which require the elected people to be of different genders.
Whilst work is evidently taking place around the world to increase the representation of minorities in politics, inclusive and intersectional gender quotas are currently still a relatively novel idea and are slowly being adopted across the world.
Conclusion
Conclusion
This paper has laid out the benefits and disadvantages of various quotas and discussed their implementation under two different families of voting systems; majoritarian and proportional. It finds that legislative quotas are the most effective at increasing women’s representation across the political party spectrum, especially when they come with sanctions for non-compliance. Moreover, proportional voting systems are well suited to the application of a variety of legislative quotas. Gender quotas are gaining more support worldwide and within the UK. In a statement in 2023, the First Minister of Wales announced a Bill which will legislate for mandatory gender quotas for future Senedd elections. If the Senedd does pass legislation around gender quotas it would be the first instance of gender quotas within the UK.
For gender parity to be achieved in elected bodies both the electoral system and the mechanism for increasing women’s participation need to be aligned. The most effective method used around the world is legislative quotas with sanctions applied for when these are not met, alongside a proportional representation voting system which allows quotas to be implemented and women to stand in multi-member constituencies with relative ease in comparison to under a majoritarian system.
Annex
Country lists
Annex 1: List of countries with legislated gender quotas or reserved seats in the lower or upper house of parliament or at the sub-national level (2024)
| Country |
Single/Lower House |
Upper house |
Sub-National Level |
| Afghanistan |
RS |
None legislated |
RS |
| Albania |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Algeria |
LCQ |
None legislated |
RS |
| Angola |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Argentina |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Armenia |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Bangladesh |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Belgium |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Benin |
RS |
– |
– |
| Bolivia |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Brazil |
LCQ |
None legislated |
LCQ |
| Burkina Faso |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Burundi |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Cabo Verde |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Central African Republic |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Chad |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Chile |
LCQ |
– |
None legislated |
| China |
RS |
– |
None legislated |
| Colombia |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Comoros |
– |
– |
LCQ |
| Republic of The Congo (Brazzaville) |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Costa Rica |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Côte d’Ivoire |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Croatia |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Djibouti |
RS |
– |
None legislated |
| Dominican Republic |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Ecuador |
LCQ |
None legislated |
LCQ |
| Egypt |
RS |
– |
RS |
| El Salvador |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Eritrea |
RS |
– |
RS |
| France |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Gabon |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Georgia |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Greece |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Guinea |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Guyana |
RS |
– |
None legislated |
| Haiti |
RS |
RS |
– |
| Honduras |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| India |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Indonesia |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Iraq |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Ireland |
LCQ |
None legislated |
None legislated |
| Italy |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Jordan |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Kazakhstan |
LCQ |
None legislated |
LCQ |
| Kenya |
RS |
RS |
RS |
| Korea, Republic of |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Kyrgyzstan |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Lesotho |
LCQ |
– |
RS |
| Liberia |
LCQ |
LCQ |
RS |
| Libya |
LCQ |
– |
– |
| Luxembourg |
LCQ |
– |
None legislated |
| North Macedonia, Republic of |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Maldives |
– |
– |
RS |
| Mali |
LCQ |
– |
RS |
| Malta |
LCQ |
– |
None legislated |
| Mauritania |
LCQ |
None legislated |
LCQ |
| Mauritius |
None legislated |
– |
LCQ |
| Mexico |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Moldova, Republic of |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Mongolia |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Montenegro |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Morocco |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Namibia |
None legislated |
– |
LCQ |
| Nepal |
RS |
– |
LCQ |
| Nicaragua |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Niger |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Norway |
None legislated |
– |
LCQ |
| Pakistan |
RS |
RS |
RS |
| State of Palestine |
LCQ |
– |
RS |
| Panama |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Papua New Guinea |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Paraguay |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Peru |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Philippines |
None legislated |
– |
RS |
| Poland |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Portugal |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Rwanda |
RS |
RS |
LCQ |
| Samoa |
RS |
– |
None legislated |
| São Tomé and Príncipe |
LCQ |
– |
None legislated |
| Saudi Arabia |
RS |
– |
– |
| Senegal |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Serbia |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Sierra Leone |
RS |
– |
LCQ |
| Slovenia |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Solomon Islands |
LCQ |
– |
– |
| Somalia |
RS |
– |
None legislated |
| South Africa |
None legislated |
None legislated |
LCQ |
| Spain |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Sri Lanka |
None legislated |
– |
RS |
| South Sudan |
LCQ |
LCQ |
RS |
| Sudan |
RS |
– |
None legislated |
| Eswatini |
RS |
RS |
– |
| Taiwan |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Tanzania, United Republic of |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Timor-Leste |
LCQ |
– |
RS |
| Togo |
LCQ |
– |
None legislated |
| Uganda |
RS |
– |
RS |
| Ukraine |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| United Arab Emirates |
RS |
– |
None legislated |
| Uruguay |
LCQ |
LCQ |
LCQ |
| Uzbekistan |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Vanuatu |
None legislated |
– |
RS |
| Venezuela |
LCQ |
– |
LCQ |
| Viet Nam |
LCQ |
None legislated |
– |
| Zimbabwe |
RS |
LCQ |
LCQ |
Annex 2: List of countries with voluntary party quotas (2024)
| Countries in which at least one political party uses voluntary party quotas |
| Algeria |
| Andorra |
| Angola |
| Argentina |
| Australia |
| Austria |
| Benin |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| Botswana |
| Brazil |
| Burkina Faso |
| Cameroon |
| Canada |
| Chile |
| Costa Rica |
| Côte d’Ivoire |
| Croatia |
| Cyprus |
| Czechia |
| El Salvador |
| Equatorial Guinea |
| France |
| Germany |
| Greece |
| Guatemala |
| Honduras |
| Hungary |
| Iceland |
| Ireland |
| Israel |
| Italy |
| Japan |
| Kenya |
| Korea, Republic of |
| Liberia |
| Lithuania |
| Luxembourg |
| Malawi |
| Malaysia |
| Mali |
| Malta |
| Mauritius |
| Moldova, Republic of |
| Mozambique |
| Namibia |
| Netherlands |
| New Zealand |
| North Macedonia, Republic of |
| Norway |
| Paraguay |
| Philippines |
| Poland |
| Portugal |
| Romania |
| Slovakia |
| Slovenia |
| Somalia |
| South Africa |
| Spain |
| Sweden |
| Switzerland |
| Tanzania, United Republic of |
| Thailand |
| Turkey |
| Uganda |
| United Kingdom |
| Uruguay |
| Zimbabwe |
Thanks
We’d like to thank the following for their kind donations towards this report: Acourt Wayne, Alastair Gordon, Tom Yates, Bruce White, Hilary Brazell, Guy Johnson, Morgwn Trolinger, Peter Eaglestone, David Baillie, Suki Kyme, David Eastlick, Jo Emery, Rod Siddall, Jean Malcolm, Charlotte Fulford, Mark Lelliott, Fiona McOwan, Jeanne Rathbone, Jennifer Bennett, David Hill, Neil Bradley, Michael Rozdoba, Rita Leighton, John Caley, Kelvin Lewis, John Attwooll, Barbara Browse, Frank Palmer, David Barnard, Rob Charman, John Corrie, Mike Thomas, Gillian Marsden, Ross Sargent, Mike Carter, F G Wilson, David Singerman, Brin Jenkins, Richard Finch, Julia Cook, Luigi Fonda, Sarah Wright, Michael Ramsdale, Allan Carruthers, Andrea Ryan and Michael Browne.