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The case for AV |
The arguments against |
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All MPs would have the support of a majority of their voters. Following the 2010 General Election, two thirds of the MPs elected lacked majority support, the highest figure in British political history. |
AV is not proportional representation and in certain electoral conditions, such as landslides, can produce a more disproportional result than First Past the Post (FPTP) |
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It retains the same constituencies, meaning no need to redraw boundaries, and no overt erosion of the constituency-MP link. |
In close three-way races the “compromise” candidate could be defeated in the first round even though they may be more broadly acceptable to the electorate than the top two candidates. |
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It penalises extremist parties, who are unlikely to gain many second-preference votes. |
Lower preferences can potentially throw up a “lowest common denominator” winner without much positive support of their own. |
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It encourages candidates to chase second- and third-preferences, which lessens the need for negative campaigning (one doesn't want to alienate the supporters of another candidate whose second preferences one wants) and rewards broad-church policies. |
A voting system that allows voters to rank candidates is prone to so-called 'Donkey voting', where voters vote for candidates in the order they appear on the ballot |
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It reduces the need for tactical voting. Electors can vote for their first-choice candidate without fear of wasting their vote. |
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It reduces the number of “safe seats” where the election result is a forgone conclusion |
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